

EXHIBIT 1

REDACTION KEY

- A. CLASSIFIED FBI INFORMATION RE-REVIEWED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 14040.
- C-1. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT(S) AND WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATION TO BE COMPLETED BY THE DEADLINE IN EO 14040 SECTION 2(D).
- D. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE IS REQUIRED. INFORMATION FOR WHICH JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION IS OBTAINED WILL BE RELEASED.
- F. ADMINISTRATIVELY DESIGNATED FBI FILE AND/OR SERIAL NUMBERS OR HANDLING INFORMATION.
- G. SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE.
- J-1. SECTION 102A(i)(1) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED BY THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1).
- J-2. INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY THE BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE BSA. SEE 31 C.F.R. § 5311 ET SEQ; 31 C.F.R. CHAPTER X.
- J-3. INFORMATION DETERMINED BY ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
- O-1. INFORMATION WITHHELD AT THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT.
- P. INFORMATION RESTRICTED FROM PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. SUCH INFORMATION WILL BE PRODUCED IN MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) PURSUANT TO THE PRIVACY ACT PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN THAT CASE.
- P-1. INFORMATION SUCH AS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, DATES OF BIRTH, AND OTHER SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION.
- S. NAMES AND OTHER PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL.

NOTE: Classification markings (classification banners and portion markings) are redacted without a code throughout the release.

EO 14040-
000343-352

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE**Date:** 01/26/2006**To:** Counterterrorism**Attn:**

(G), (S)

From: San

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka Omar AlKhatib,
Omar Khadib,
Cumar Khadhiib,

(A), (J-1), (G)

Synopsis:

Submission of (A), (J-1), (G) LHM

(G)

Full Field Investigation Instituted:

(A), (G), (J-1)

(USPER)

Administrative:Enclosed for (G) for dissemination
is (A), (J-1), (G) LHM ref. investigation of captioned subject.**Details:****Previous Investigation**

(S) INS advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED was born on (P-1) (P) in Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1) (P-1) MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P) On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED

EO14040-000343

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/26/2006

submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

[REDACTED] AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia.

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB AND HASSAN [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB is a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. It was also discussed that America is an enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/26/2006

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to [REDACTED] (O-1) and told [REDACTED] (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, [REDACTED] (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe. [REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, [REDACTED] (P) and [REDACTED] (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: [REDACTED] (P-1). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to [REDACTED] (P) which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000345

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/26/2006

(A), (G), (J-1) KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown (A), (G), (J-1)

Current Investigation:

[REDACTED] On January 22, 2004, Omar Mohamed was arrested on immigration charges of lying on his naturalization application and is currently in federal custody awaiting trial.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's wife (P) [REDACTED] born (P-1) (P) in (P) [REDACTED] California drivers license number (P-1) SSAN (P-1) [REDACTED] telephone number (P) [REDACTED] was interviewed upon Mohamed's arrest. (P) [REDACTED] stated they were married in 1986 and have six children. Four of the children are Canadian citizens by birth and two are US citizens by birth.

[REDACTED] Mohamed was employed by the San Diego City Schools at a school on 54th and University (NFI). (P) [REDACTED] and Mohamed have no other business or employment. (P) [REDACTED] and Mohamed have no business interests or employment outside the US.

[REDACTED] In July or August 199 [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] Mohamed and their two oldest children traveled to Kenya. (P) [REDACTED] recalled they flew from San Diego to New York to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

(P) [REDACTED] recalled that her relationship with Mohamed changed in 2000. In late 2000, Mohamed traveled to Australia. (P) [REDACTED] is not sure of his purpose of travel, but believed that Mohamed was traveling related to his relationship with an Australian woman.

[REDACTED] According to (P) [REDACTED] Mohamed has relatives in Sydney, Australia. Mohamed's father's cousin lives in Sydney, and he also has relatives in Kenya. (P) [REDACTED] recalled that Mohamed had returned one time each year since 2000. (P) [REDACTED] did not know Mohamed's travel plans, but according to Mohamed he went to Australia. Mohamed's last travel was from September 2003 to December 25, 2003, (P) [REDACTED] believed that the trip took Mohamed to Australia.

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 01/26/2006

[REDACTED] Investigation further determined that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) of the Masjid Taqwa in San Diego, California, sponsored Omar Abdi Mohamed's religious worker entry into the US. [REDACTED] (P) was approached by a blue eyed Somali who represented the San Diego Somali Muslim community. The blue eyed Somali, not [REDACTED] (P), encouraged [REDACTED] (P) to sponsor Mohamed.

[REDACTED] As Mohamed was arrested, a search warrant was served on his residence. In this search several Arabic language documents on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, IFTA Office, letterhead with address 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington DC 20037, Telephone (202) 342-3700, were seized by investigating agents.

[REDACTED] These documents were subsequently translated by a San Diego Division Arabic language specialist. Of interest, these documents contain written directions from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance to Omar Abdi Mohamed to collect information on Muslim converts and the Islamic publications produced by local mosques and the Somali community. The seized documents include mention of a contractual relationship between Mohamed and the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance; a Saudi Ministry checklist of Muslim convert reporting criteria; a request for reports on the Arab and Somali communities in Canada and San Diego; and a note of leadership personnel changes within the American Dawa Office.

[REDACTED] Mohamed received, by his own admission, over \$100,000 from the Saudi Ministry. Mohamed apparently began receiving this money in the mid 1990's, and was recently receiving \$1,750.00 a month up and until he was arrested. After his arrest, it appears that the Ministry payments into Mohamed's bank account were discontinued.

[REDACTED] With specific regards to captioned subject, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance sent Mohamed a letter dated February 14, 1996, requesting Mohamed to "provide us with information about well known personalities in their respective communities who have converted to Islam. Especially on such figures like well known Christian ministers and clerics, government ministers, ambassadors, businessmen, doctors, engineers, laureates and intellectuals, and university instructors, individuals who play an influential role in their communities and are highly regarded." The Ministry attached a form with the mentioned letter that was to be filled with the converts full name prior to conversion to Islam, full name after conversion to Islam, and date of conversion to Islam, occupation prior to conversion, occupation after conversion, social activities prior to conversion, social activities after conversion, impact that his conversion to Islam had on others, current address, and other information. The

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000347

[REDACTED]

To: nterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 01/26/2006

letter was signed by Director of Dawa Office in America, Khalid bin Ibrahim AlSuwaylim.

[REDACTED] In a letter dated May 28, 1998, [REDACTED] (P)

(P)

wrote Saudi Arabia a handwritten request for funding a school they wanted to start in San Diego, California. The Ministry was contacting Mohamed so he could provide further information on the people and the circumstances surrounding the starting of the new school. According to the handwritten letter the five men were forced to flee their native lands because of the "infidels" and they wanted to start an Islamic school because "This land is the land of the infidels, and you are aware of that."

[REDACTED] The Ministry also sent out notices of personnel changes within the Saudi Dawa Office in America. One letter dated January 17, 1998, was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California." San Diego notes that AlThumairi is the subject of [REDACTED] (F). According to LA LHM dated 1/24/2004, the investigation of AL-THUMAIRY was predicated on FBI investigation determined that AL-THUMAIRY had substantial contact with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI. ALBAYOUMI had significant contact with two September 11th hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar who lived in San Diego, California, in 2000.

[REDACTED] To date, investigation of Mohamed has not determined the extent, if any, that he reported on the Muslim community and Muslim converts. However, San Diego opines that if Mohamed had not complied with Saudi directives with regards to requests for information and Islamic outreach, he would not have continued to receive his monthly payments from the Ministry. Also unknown is the extent, if any, that Saudi Arabia reimbursed Mohamed for his frequent domestic and international travel. Investigation at San Diego is ongoing.

[REDACTED] Also found were two Arabic language certificate style documents. One of these documents, as translated by San Diego, was issued to Omar Abdo Mohammad al-Khatib by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Deputyship of Islamic Affairs Forum Program. The document was noted to be an "Attendance Certificate" for the "first forum for training Propagators in America that was organized by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa and Guidance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 27/08/1998 to 04/09/1998". According to the document the attendees received training in Science of the Koran, Science of the Hadith, Islamic Dogma, the Jurisprudence of Islamic Law, Principles of the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, and Propagation." The document was signed by Mohamad bin Abed AlMuhsen AlTurki.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] 01/26/2006

[REDACTED] A second similar Arabic certificate was found from the "Islamic African Center in Khartoum, the Dawa Branch, for a training course for Imams and Propagators held in coordination with the Saudi Fatwa body, the World Muslim League, and Imam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University" from 06/08/1988 to 31/08/1988. This document also certified that Omar Abdi Mohamad attended the training course which included "lectures on Propagation, Science of the Koran, the life of the Prophet Mohamed, the jurisprudence of Islamic Law, anti-Islamic ideologies, and Islamic education issues in the African continent. The signatory for the document was illegible.

[REDACTED] Mohamed's attorney, Mahir Sharif, submitted declarations from [REDACTED] (P), born [REDACTED] (P-1) / [REDACTED] (P), California drivers license number, [REDACTED] (P), La Mesa, California, [REDACTED] (P-1), and [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), born [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P), California drivers license number [REDACTED] (P-1) [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California, [REDACTED] (P), as character references on behalf of captioned subject's immigration removal/deportation proceedings.

[REDACTED] Of note in the declaration, both [REDACTED] (P) claim that they were partners with Mohamed in the corporation [REDACTED] (P), San Diego, California, telephone number [REDACTED] (P). According to both [REDACTED] (P) the [REDACTED] (P) was opened in August 2003 and as of March 2004, was still in operation. Mohamed is an officer of the corporation and was going to make use of his MBA for the benefit of the business. Mohamed was actively participating the building of the business when he was arrested.

[REDACTED]

(J-2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Investigation to date has not found that Omar Abdi Mohamed is associated as a board member or officer of the [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/26/2006

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]
(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/26/2006

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (C-1) [REDACTED]

Trial results

[REDACTED] After two trials in 2006, Mohamed was found guilty of six counts of immigration fraud and acquitted on three. Mohamed was sentenced to 18 months (time served) on each of the six guilty counts, assessed a fine, and was given two years supervised release. After his sentencing, Mohamed was remanded into ICE custody and is currently being held for possible revocation of his US permanent legal resident alien status and consequent deportation. The first deportation hearing is scheduled for January 31, 2006.

[REDACTED] The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	[REDACTED] (P-1) /1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	[REDACTED] (P-1)
CADLN	[REDACTED]
INS A#:	[REDACTED]
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Black
Residence:	[REDACTED] (P-1) La Mesa, CA 91941 [REDACTED] (P-1)

Occupation: President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 01/26/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] disseminate enclosed LHM as appropriate.

◆◆

EO 14040-
000488-491

FBI-CIA Joint Assessment

Issued December 2004

The following document was previously produced in discovery in MDL 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.) pursuant to the protective order with redactions for classification. The cover page, scope note, and the full executive summary are being released at this time.

The remainder of the document is the subject of an ongoing declassification review by other U.S. government agencies and departments consistent with Executive Order 14040 and will be posted publicly at the conclusion of that review.



COLLABORATIVE
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

**Assessment of Saudi Arabian
Support to Terrorism and the
Counterintelligence Threat to the
United States**



Joint Intelligence Report
Prepared by

December 2004

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Central Intelligence
Agency

[REDACTED]

Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States

Scope Note

This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director [REDACTED] (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at (S) [REDACTED] (S) or Section Chief [REDACTED] (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at [REDACTED] (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center, at [REDACTED] (O-1)

Executive Summary

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Bin Laden materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

EO 14040-
000556-568

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/19/2009

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)
(S)

International Operations

Attn:

(G)

Riyadh

Attn:

(G)

San Diego

Attn:

(S)

New York

Attn:

(S)

From: New York

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis:

Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY

(G)

Enclosure(s):

1 - Opening LHM

EO14040-000556

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

Full Investigation Initiated: 02/12/2009

Reference: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]-OPERATION ENCORE, (F) [REDACTED].

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case.

[REDACTED] Background: On 08/28/2007, writers opened the OPERATION ENCORE investigation that contained information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, OPERATION ENCORE was opened. Writers opined that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, writers were interested in gaining a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two years, writers have interviewed multiple individuals including some of those detailed in the referenced serial and additional confidential human sources (CHS) related to the PENTTBOM investigation, who were also knowledgeable of events and individuals in Los Angeles and San Diego in late 1999 and early 2000. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

Exploitation of Muslim Community: Multiple (A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. (A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED], AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-providing individual, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-providing individual or to whom the tazkia would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) [REDACTED] believed that it likely would have involved someone or multiple persons who had access to the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F) [REDACTED] serial [REDACTED]). It is important to note that the individual to whom the tazkia directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, (A),(G),(J-1) [REDACTED], the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

(G) [REDACTED] One individual meeting such description who is also reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in closed case# (F) [REDACTED]. AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F) [REDACTED] Additional documentation from (C-1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F), 02/19/2009

(C-1)
(F) . AL-THUMARY was previously the subject of an FI out of the Los Angeles Division based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI through phone calls and AL-THUMARY's potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F). According to the closing EC (F) (F) and supplemental closing EC (F) (F) the FI was closed due to: i) AL-THUMARY's relocation to Saudi Arabia, ii) an exhaustion of "all reasonable and practical intelligence collection methods". However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community appears to have been unknown at such time.

If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another unknown individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another unknown individual(s) there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such unknown individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact with [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from Ottawa, Canada to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a Somali/Yemeni student living in San Diego would [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

([REDACTED]) Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on 09/11/2001, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000560

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F), (G), 02/19/2009

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to TA, AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on 12/ [REDACTED] 1998. After which, for almost [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included, however also see paragraph below) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate ([REDACTED] (F)).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY [REDACTED] (F).

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE [REDACTED] (F). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. (O-1)

" [REDACTED] (O-1), AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL-JARRAH travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

" [REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. [REDACTED] (O-1) AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California" (F) [REDACTED].

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients" (F) [REDACTED]. The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F) [REDACTED]. During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), an officer/owner of (P) [REDACTED] and president of (P) [REDACTED] received (P) [REDACTED] from AL-THUMARY. At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) [REDACTED] arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) [REDACTED] business card with the phone number (P) [REDACTED] on his person.

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000563

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 02/19/2009

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, a Somali extremist (O-1) case # (F) and was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. NOTE: "AIAI is an international terrorism organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG)." (F) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F). This stipend was likely administered, because of his particular position by either AL-JARRAH, or one of his subordinates, possibly AL-THUMARY as MOHAMED was located in California.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1), "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F)

Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number 966-55-857311 is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

The significance of this three-day long heightened contact remains unclear. However, a few items seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulates that distributed funds and support to extremists, and, it appears in some case, terrorist organizations; 2) there were inexplicable, at least currently, telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AL-HAZMI; 3) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Recruitment: Although, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, may not have arrived in southern California with an active support network, it seems that once they were vouched into the local community they may have begun to vet individuals for those individual's willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F) [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED]. Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of all the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

Predication for the Investigation

As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project (F) [REDACTED] established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia. This methodology could possible be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into," what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
 Re: (F) 02/19/2009

these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

At this point in the investigation, there are number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -	
Last:	AL-THUMARY
First:	FAHAD
Middle:	I. A.
Race:	W
Sex:	M
DOB:	(P) 1971
POB:	Saudi Arabia
PNO:	(P) Official)
SOC:	(P)
Alias(es) -	
Last:	AL-THUMAIRY
First:	FN
Middle:	MN
Phone #:	(P)
Current Location:	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 02/19/2009

Miscellaneous:
[REDACTED] (G)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (G)

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 02/19/2009

AT WASHINGTON, DC

The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED]
is requested to process the (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via
email to the (G) mailbox at (G) [REDACTED]
(G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦


EO 14040-
000582-587



(G)
February 22, 2010

OPERATION ENCORE/

(A),(G),(J-1)





Operation Encore (A),(G),(J-1) Overview

Although (A), (J-1), (G) Operation Encore are separate investigations, understanding the links between the two cases is important to the overall strategy of (A),(G),(J-1). This paper will lay out (A),(G),(J-1) key players, associations, communications, and provide an overview of Op Encore. This paper will also explain how the key players, communications, and logistics from both (A),(G),(J-1) Op Encore overlap. Finally, this paper will provide an outlook on (A) (G) (J-1) and briefly cover the strategy moving forward.

(A), (J-1), (G)

(A),(G),(J-1) centers on two Saudi nationals Adel al-Sadhan (F) and Mutaib al-Sudairy (F) (J-3). Al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy previously visited San Diego, California for approximately six weeks in the summer of 1999 and were hosted by Omar al-Bayoumi²—and are assessed to be part of a network of individuals connected to the facilitation of two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, (J-3).

Based on their activity patterns in 1999 and 2000, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy possibly served in the capacity of an advance intelligence team involved in laying the groundwork for 9/11 hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, before their arrival in Southern California in early 2000. There is no indication al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy had direct contact with the hijackers, however similar associations, communications, and logistics mirror those of the hijackers upon their arrival.

- () According to the US State Department Office of Foreign Missions, al-Sudairy worked as an administrative officer from June 1999 to April 2001 and al-Sadhan worked at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA) in Washington, DC; both working under Musaid al-Jarrah.³

- (J-3)

¹ (G)

² Al-Bayoumi (F) attended multiple graduate schools in California between 1995 and 2000 and performed administrative duties as the Masjid Al-Madina Al-Munawara, aka Kurdish Community Islamic Center of Greater San Diego. Al-Bayoumi left San Diego in fall 2000 to attend Aston University in Birmingham, England. He relocated to Saudi Arabia (KSA) in August 2002 where he is currently located.

³ Al-Jarrah (F) former Director of the Islamic Affairs Department in the Saudi Arabian Embassy who left his post in 2005—is currently working in the Cultural Affairs Office in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Malaysia. While in the US, (O-1) he was responsible for placing Saudi Imams around the US and was purposefully selecting extremists for the positions. (O-1) al-Jarrah was funding and controlling al-Thumairy's southern California network.

Operation Encore

Operation Encore, opened in October 2007, is an investigation to determine how two of the 9/11 hijackers—Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—integrated into and were supported by the local Muslim community where they lived in southern California in 2000.ⁱ Fahad al-Thumairy⁴ and Omar al-Bayoumi were key figures in assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi after their arrival in southern California. Analysis of al-Bayoumi and al-Thumairy's call activity indicates that the assistance provided to the hijackers likely involved a network of people including al-Bayoumi, al-Thumairy, Anwar Aulaqi and an individual at the EKSA in Washington D.C.; however, it is unclear if any of the individuals involved had pre-knowledge of 9/11 or of al-Mihdhar's and al Hazmi's role in 9/11.

- Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi did not speak English and were not familiar with Western culture which made them reliant on individuals for assistance while in the US.
- (A),(G),(J-1), (P) was tasked by al-Thumairy to pick up al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi from the airport and to take care of them while they were in Los Angeles.ⁱⁱ However, in FBI interviews with Johar, he never admitted to directly being tasked by al-Thumairy but he did admit to spending time with and assisting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with various things during their time in Los Angeles.ⁱⁱⁱ
- During an FBI interview with (P), he admitted to being instructed by al-Bayoumi to assist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during their stay in San Diego. Al-Bayoumi also told (P) that he, al-Bayoumi, was responsible for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar.^{iv}
- According to a proffer interview of Mohdar Mohammad al-Mohdar Zeid, aka Mohdar Mohammed Abdullah, he was tasked by al-Bayoumi to look after al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi during their time in San Diego.^v It remains unclear as to why Mohdar or (P) were chosen by al-Bayoumi.

Common Associates

- Al-Mihdhar and al Hazmi stayed in Los Angeles for approximately one to two weeks after their arrival in the US.^{vi} Several days after their arrival at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on 15 January 2000, al Mihdhar and al-Hazmi went to the King Fahad Mosque where they met with al Thumairy for five to ten minutes.^{vii} (J-3)
(J-3) (G), (J-3)
(G), (J-3)
- (A),(G),(J-1), al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy met with and received help finding lodging from al-Bayoumi in San Diego in 1999. For approximately six weeks while they were in San Diego, al-Sadhan and al-Sudairy lived at a Lemon Grove residence with an individual (A),(G),(J-1) also later hosted hijackers al Hazmi and al-Mihdhar when they were in San Diego.

⁴ Al-Thumairy (F) was Imam at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, CA and is described in a US State Department document as Administrative Officer at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Los Angeles, CA in 1999.

⁵ (O-1)

- [REDACTED] Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi first met with al-Bayoumi around the beginning of February at a Mediterranean restaurant in Culver City, California.^{viii} Shortly after this meeting, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi relocated to San Diego, California around February 4, 2000. Upon their arrival in San Diego, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with establishing living arrangements and opening a bank account. Mohdar Abdullah also reported that al-Bayoumi tasked him with assisting the two with their daily affairs.

Phone links

- [REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1),(D)
- [REDACTED] (G),(D)
- [REDACTED] Between 31 January 2000 and 3 February 2000, al-Bayoumi calls the EKSA seven times.^x *Note: Musaid al-Jarrah and Mutaib al-Sudairy were working at the embassy during this time.*
- [REDACTED] On 4 February 2000, al-Bayoumi assisted al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi establish a Bank of America account at approximately 1:30pm. (A),(G),(J-1)
(A),(G),(J-1),(D)

Outlook

[REDACTED] (O-1)

[REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] (A),(G),(J-1)

[REDACTED] surround al-Sadhan and Al-Sudairy's nexus to al-Qa'ida and their activities since departing from the US in 2001. Beyond their suspicious activity patterns involving the hijackers' southern California support network before 9/11 and their questionable associates, there is no independent (A), (G), (J-1) information that they were working at the behest of a terrorist network.

- [REDACTED] The only identified direct link to al-Qa'ida or any other terrorist group beyond the San Diego network is through Ziyad Khaleel, a former naturalized US citizen who

[REDACTED]

was killed in Saudi Arabia in 2002 and supplied Usama bin Laden with satellite phone equipment in the mid-1990s.

- [REDACTED] During the summer of 2000, al-Sudairy moved to Columbus, Missouri where he lived with Ziyad Khaleel for approximately four months. Khaleel and al-Sudairy met twice in Saudi Arabia after October 2001, however the FBI has no information about the context of Khaleel and al-Sadhan's relationship.

i FBI Communication (F)

ii (F)

iii (F)

iv (F)

v (F)

vi (F)

vii (F)

viii (F)

ix FBI Telephone Applications

x FBI Telephone Applications

EO 14040-
000588-601

(Rev. 06-04-2007)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 09/28/2010

To: (G)
International Operations
Counterterrorism

Attn: (S)
Attn: (G)
Attn:

Oklahoma City

Attn:

Indianapolis
New York

Attn:
Attn:

From: Counterterrorism
(G)

Contact: (S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title: OPERATION ENCORE
ADEL MOHAMMAD A AL-SADHAN
(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE
MUTAIB A A AL-SUDAIRY
(A), (G), (J-1)

EO14040-000588

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) , 09/28/2010
(A), (G), (J-1)

OPERATION ENCORE

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (J-1), (G)

DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE OFFICIAL
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

(A), (G), (J-1)

FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONS

(G)

(G)

Synopsis: (S), (G) provides authority to disseminate the
enclosed (G) tearline to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1)
authorities.

(G)

Full Investigation Initiated: (A), (G), (J-1)

Administrative: Pursuant to Attorney General Guidelines, for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom), Part VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in the interest of national security of the United States. The information is relevant to the recipient's authorized responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the National Security interests of the United States, and the FBI has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.

(G) has reviewed the information contained in the enclosed communication. Passage of this information is consistent with the standards for dissemination of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign authorities as authorized in the AGG-Dom.

The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to ensure that any intelligence information that the FBI disseminates to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities pursuant to this authorization is not and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under Executive Order 12333 or torture, as defined in U.S. criminal law. To this end, the FBI shall take the following actions:

1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the information in this document is for intelligence and lead purposes only. The information in this document may not be used in any legal proceedings or disseminated to any other agency within the recipient's government without the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 09/28/2010
contact with the subject) based on the information in this communication without first coordinating with the FBI;

2 As required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (O-1) (O-1)
(O-1) of the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI MOU, (O-1)
(O-1)

3. Legat shall report to CTD and OIO any indication that the recipient agency to whom this information has been provided did not honor the caveat regarding use or dissemination of this information, or used the information for either assassination or torture.

Details: Legat (G) has requested CTD provide (A), (G), (J-1)
authority to disseminate (G) derived
information to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities to provide
information regarding captioned subject Ahmed Mosa Alzahrani's
(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI NY investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

[REDACTED] Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy previously came to the US in June 1999 as employees of the Islamic Affairs Office at the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

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in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

(J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3)

FBI (G)

initiated (A), (J-1), (G) to investigate both subjects'

(J-3) The FBI subsequently requested and received approved

(J-3), (O-1)

The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to

(A), (G), (J-1)

Background on Operation Encore

According to I-94 information, Adil Alsadhan (believed to be identifiable with Adel Al Sadhan) entered Los Angeles on 15 December 1998 (J-3)

(J-3)

. His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his I-94 that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque (KFM) in Culver

(O-1)

The purpose for Al Sadhan's visit in 1998 is unknown, though it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy's subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight

(J-3)

(O-1)

Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. (O-1) Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

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who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time. (J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3) He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

NOTE: (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. (A), (G), (J-1) the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. (A), (G), (J-1) he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of (A), (G), (J-1) tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, (A), (G), (J-1) provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. (A), (G), (J-1) for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles, CA via LAX airport on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
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[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[REDACTED] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in order and a "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed via LAX on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[REDACTED] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[REDACTED] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulaqi was now the Imam.

[REDACTED] In May 2001, two additional hijackers arrived in the US - Ahmed Al-Ghambi and Majed Moqed. The four drove to Connecticut where they checked into a Fairfield Inn and then immediately drove to Patterson, NJ to look for a place to live. Within 3 days, they began renting rooms at a house in Patterson. Al-Mihdhar also arrived

[REDACTED]

SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

at the Patterson location in May. All of the hijackers stayed at this Patterson location until days before 11 September 2001.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulaqi.

Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

Al Sadhan was previously the subject of (A)(G)(J-1) investigation was opened based on (A)(G)(J-1) This that Al Sadhan worked under (A), (G), (J-1) (O-1) Musaed Al-Jarrah (F) t the Islamic Affairs Section of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC helping Al-Jarrah coordinate/direct all Saudi Imams assigned to and/or financially supported by the Saudi government in the US. Al Sadhan reportedly helped Al-Jarrah support extremist Saudi Sunnis in the United States. Al Sadhan was (O-1) as a believer in a radical form of Sunni Salafism and reportedly traveled frequently within the United States. However, because records checks indicated Al Sadhan left the US on 25 October 2001 and had not returned, the (G) case was closed in 2004.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (J-1), (G), (D)

(A), (J-1), (G), (D)

EO14040-000594

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F), 09/28/2010
(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FBIHQ notifies Legat (G) that DIDO authority has been granted to disseminate the enclosed CTD approved tearline to the appropriate (A), (G), (J-1) authorities.

-----Begin Tearline-----

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED] (F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The following individuals are subjects of a pending FBI counterterrorism investigation:

Adel Mohammed A. Al Sadhan

Citizenship: Saudi Arabia

Date of Birth: (P-1) 1973

Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (P-1)

Mutaib A.A. Al Sudairy

Citizenship: Saudi Arabia

Date of Birth: (P-1) 1971

Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (P-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Citizenship: Saudi Arabia

Date of Birth: (A), (G), (J-1)

Passport #s: Saudi Arabia (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] For background, Operation Encore is an FBI investigation of Fahad al-Thumairy, Omar al-Bayoumi, and Musaed al-Jarrah due to their past association with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. Information uncovered through phone analysis, financial analysis, and numerous interviews suggests the aforementioned subjects assisted the hijackers, wittingly or unwittingly, in a support/logistics role while they were in the United States.

[REDACTED] FBI investigation conducted through Operation Encore uncovered two additional individuals, Adel Al Sadhan

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

Re: (F), 09/28/2010

and Mutaib Al Sudairy, with a past connection to the subjects of Operation Encore. (A), (G), (J-1) along with telephone and financial analysis, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have assisted in laying the groundwork for the arrival of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in southern California and served as an advance team to vet those who would later assist both hijackers.

(O-1)

(O-1)

(O-1)

in Washington, DC and had direct contact with Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy and Omar Al-Bayoumi who assisted two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, with living, financial and travel arrangements while they were in southern California in early 2000. Although Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy never had direct contact with the 9/11 hijackers, Al Sadhan likely met with Al-Thumairy in person in 1998, approximately one year before the hijackers arrived in the US, and both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy met with Al-Bayoumi in 1999 who assisted them during their six week stay in San Diego approximately six months before the arrival of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. This contact, paired with analysis of call records and travel patterns during the time the two hijackers were in southern California, indicates Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy may have served as an advance team who helped to arrange people to assist Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar during their time in southern California.

(J-3)

The FBI then began to investigate both subjects' return to the US.

The FBI has no information to suggest that either Al Sadhan or Al Sudairy is an operator - that is, that they present a direct threat of violent terrorist activity. However, if Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy are currently involved with facilitation efforts on behalf of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates, the FBI has assessed that allowing them to travel to the US will provide a unique opportunity to collect intelligence on their activities and contacts while in the US, potentially including unknown US-based individuals tied to terrorism.

Background on Operation Encore

According to US travel information Adel Al Sadhan entered Los Angeles, California on 15 December 1998 on (J-3) His intended address was the Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles and he listed a contact telephone number on his travel documents that was subscribed to Fahad Al-Thumairy, Imam at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA. The purpose for Al Sadhan's visit in 1998 is unknown, though

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism

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it establishes the first known contact between Al Sadhan and Al-Thumairy. Investigators believe his visit was to begin preparations for Al-Thumairy's subsequent assistance to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar. Al Sadhan departed Los Angeles on 20 January 1999.

[REDACTED] Al Sadhan returned to the US on 13 June 1999, this time accompanied by an associate, Mutaib Al Sudairy. Both men entered via Washington, DC on the same flight [REDACTED]
(J-3)

[REDACTED] Musaed Al-Jarrah was then director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. Al-Jarrah was stationed in Washington, DC from 1991 to 2005. Al-Jarrah's official responsibilities were to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams in the United States and facilitate the issuance of their diplomatic visas. Sources reported that Al-Jarrah may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the Embassy. It was Al-Jarrah who determined Al-Thumairy's assignment, placing him in Southern California at the King Fahad Mosque during this time.
(J-3)

[REDACTED] He had a reputation for being a "Salafi fanatic" and as a possible source of motivation for violent or terrorist activity.

[REDACTED] NOTE: During interviews with detained al-Qaeda member Ali Mohammed, Mohammed stated that in 1992 or 1994 he was tasked by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to get a list of all Saudi Embassy employees in the United States. Mohammed stated that the reason for this was to find and recruit a sympathizer within the Saudi Embassy. Mohammed claimed that he went to a local library and photocopied a list of Embassy employees from a book in the reference section and hand-delivered the list to UBL. Al-Jarrah began working at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC in 1991. During the time frame of Mohammed's tasking from UBL, Al-Jarrah would have been on the photocopied list.

[REDACTED] In 1999, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy traveled to San Diego where they stayed for approximately 6 weeks (approximately July 1999 to August 1999) and met with Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi student who had resided in San Diego since 1995. Al-Bayoumi greeted them and, (A), (G), (J-1), provided a place to live and looked after them. FBI investigation indicates Al-Bayoumi may have provided them with a cell phone. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) for a period of time Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy lived at the same address in San Diego where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later stay near the Al-Ribat mosque.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F) 09/28/2010

[REDACTED] In December 1999/January 2000, several of the 9/11 hijackers met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia prior to arriving in the US. During this same time frame, numerous telephone calls occurred between main Operation Encore subjects Fahad Al-Thumairy, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Musaed Al-Jarrah.

[REDACTED] On 15 January 2000, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi arrived in Los Angeles on a flight from Bangkok originating from Malaysia. The first place they visited was the King Fahad Mosque where Fahad Al-Thumairy was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Thumairy tasked an associate to look after Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi during their time in Los Angeles, to include transportation, lodging, etc. In subsequent interviews with the FBI, the associate stated that the hijackers asked him specifically where the "Mediterranean restaurant" was. Approximately one week later, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi went to the Mediterranean restaurant where they met with Omar Al-Bayoumi.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi invited the two to move to San Diego, CA. Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi moved to San Diego sometime in late January/early February 2000. At this time, Al-Bayoumi's telephonic contact with Musaed Al-Jarrah increased. Once the hijackers moved from Los Angeles to San Diego, Al-Thumairy's telephonic contact with Al-Jarrah was diminished.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in renting an apartment in San Diego, co-signing a lease agreement with them. He also assisted them in opening a bank account. Of note, approximately 1 hour before taking the hijackers to the bank, Anwar Aulaqi called that specific bank location and had a 2 minute conversation with an unknown individual. Approximately 1 hour after setting up the accounts and leaving the bank, Al-Bayoumi placed a call to Aulaqi.

[REDACTED] While in San Diego, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Al-Ribat mosque where Aulaqi was the Imam.

[REDACTED] Al-Bayoumi called Al Sudairy five (5) times while the hijackers were in San Diego with Al-Bayoumi. The dates of the calls are significant. The first set of calls are 24 January, 26 January, and 30 January 2000 - this was the week Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers in Culver City, CA and talked to them about coming to San Diego. The next call occurred on 2 February 2000. On 4 February 2000 Al-Bayoumi co-signed a loan agreement for the apartment he obtained for the hijackers and brought them to a Bank of America to assist them in opening a bank account. The last call occurred on 7 February 2000. By this date, the hijackers' affairs were in

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F), 09/28/2010
order and a "welcoming party" for the hijackers was coordinated by Al-Bayoumi and likely held on 17 February 2000.

[REDACTED] In June 2000, Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi left San Diego and drove to Los Angeles. Al-Mihdhar was scheduled to leave the US and return to Yemen. They drove to the King Fahad Mosque where Al-Thumairy said goodbye to Al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar departed the US on 20 June 2000. Al-Hazmi continued to reside in San Diego.

[REDACTED] On 8 December 2000, another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, arrived in San Diego and joined Al-Hazmi. They immediately left for Phoenix, AZ where Hanjour began flight lessons.

[REDACTED] In April of 2001, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour arrived in Falls Church, VA and established residence. They attended the Dar al Hijra mosque where Aulagi was now the Imam.

Background on Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy

[REDACTED] After their time in San Diego in 1999, Al Sudairy subsequently moved to Columbus, Missouri and Al Sadhan moved to Lawrence, Kansas. While in Missouri, Al Sudairy lived with Ziyad Khaleel for about four months in 2000. Khaleel was a known key communications equipment procurement officer for Usama Bin Laden and provided satellite phones used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa. Following Al Sudairy's return to Saudi Arabia in 2001 he met with Khaleel twice.

[REDACTED] In April 2001, both Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were terminated from their responsibilities at the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The two men, at this point, were living in Washington, DC. At the same time, two of the hijackers, Al-Hazmi and Hanjour, arrived in Falls Church, VA and attended the mosque of Anwar Aulagi. Al Sudairy and Al Sadhan both left the United States on 25 October 2001.

[REDACTED] While in Missouri, Al Sudairy attended University of Missouri - Columbia's Intensive English program. In October 2001, faculty members alerted the FBI as they had been suspicious of him since he didn't appear interested in learning English. His peers believed he was a Saudi Arabian Intelligence officer.

Current Travel to the US

[REDACTED] Recent information obtained by the FBI revealed that [REDACTED]

(J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3)

[REDACTED]

To: (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: (F), 09/28/2010

[REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (P-1) .

Background on Al-Zahrani

[REDACTED] The FBI initiated an investigation of Saudi Arabia-based Ahmed Mosa Al-Zahrani after determining he was an associate and possible student of Al Sudairy. Al-Zahrani previously applied to attend English classes at Ball State University in Indiana around the same time. [REDACTED] (J-3)

[REDACTED] (J-3)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) We have not identified any familial relation between Al-Zahrani and Al Sudairy, and have no indication that Al Sudairy is providing [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to any other individuals.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

Al Sudairy's Interest in [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)
[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

Request for Meeting

[REDACTED] The FBI respectfully requests a meeting with your service to provide an in-depth briefing regarding all aspects of this FBI investigation. Please coordinate with the Legal Attache to determine a time and place suitable for your service.

[REDACTED] As always, your assistance in counterterrorism matters is greatly appreciated. We welcome any additional information your Government has developed regarding this matter.

[REDACTED]

-----End Tearline-----

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED] (G) From: Counterterrorism
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 09/28/2010
[REDACTED] Questions regarding this communication should be directed
to SSA [REDACTED] (S), IA [REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S), or SOS [REDACTED] (S).

EO 14040-
000628-636

(G)

FM FBI WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT

CITE: (G)
PASS:

SUBJECT: INEXORABLE/POSTDILUVIAN - TO REPORT INFORMATION
ON OPERATION ENCORE.

DEATILS: ON 24 FEBRUARY 2010, THE FBI BRIEFED
REPRESENTATIVES FROM CTC/GJ AT LANGLEY REGARDING OPERATION ENCORE
(J-3)

(J-3) THE BELOW INFORMATION
SERVES TO SUMMARIZE THIS BRIEFING.

ON 28 JUNE 2007, A SUBFILE UNDER THE PENTTBOM
INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO CONTAIN INFORMATION
GARNERED FROM THE PLANNED EXPLOITATION OF INTELLIGENCE TARGETS
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION.
THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION FUNCTIONED AS BOTH A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION INTO THE
9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED INDIVIDUALS WITH
VARIOUS LEVELS OF CONNECTIVITY TO THE 9/11 HIJACKERS WHOM COULD
BE FURTHER EXPLOITED FOR ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE. BY
REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF THE PENTTBOM INVESTIGATION, THE FBI
BELIEVED THAT CERTAIN AL-QAEDA TACTICS AND TRADECRAFT COULD BE
REVEALED.

SPECIFICALLY, THE FBI WAS INTERESTED IN GAINING A GREATER
UNDERSTANDING OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF
AL-HAZMI'S PAST INTERACTION WITH AND CONNECTIVITY TO THE LOCAL
(SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAN) MUSLIM COMMUNITY. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING
WOULD ASSIST IN EXPLAINING THE APPARENT EASE WITH WHICH
AL-MIHDHAR AND AL-HAZMI EXPLOITED THAT COMMUNITY TO GAIN
ASSISTANCE AND SAFE HARBOR.

OPERATION ENCORE WAS EVENTUALLY OPENED BY FBI NEW YORK TO
FULLY INVESTIGATE THE NETWORK UNCOVERED DURING THE INITIAL

EO14040-000628

INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER PENTBOM.

■ ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WERE INITIATED ON FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, OMAR AHMED AL-BAYOUMI, AND MUSAED AL-JARRAH DUE TO THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH 9/11 HIJACKERS NAWAF AL-HAZMI AND KHALID AL-MIHDHAR. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF INFORMATION UNCOVERED THROUGH PHONE ANALYSIS, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, AND NUMEROUS INTERVIEWS THAT SUGGESTS THE AFOREMENTIONED SUBJECTS ASSISTED THE HIJACKERS IN A SUPPORT/LOGISTICS ROLE WHILE THEY WERE IN THE U.S. THEY ARE SUSPECTED OF PROVIDING THE HIJACKERS WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, OBTAINING DRIVERS LICENSES AND LIVING QUARTERS, PROVIDING SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE, AND LOCATING FLIGHT SCHOOLS.

■ DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION IT WAS REVEALED THAT TWO ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS WITH LINKS TO AL-THUMAIRY, AL-BAYOUMI, AND AL-JARRAH - (J-3)

(J-3) (J-3) ALTHOUGH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE 9/11 HIJACKERS, AL SADHAN LIKELY MET WITH AL-THUMAIRY IN PERSON IN 1998, APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR BEFORE THE HIJACKERS ARRIVED IN THE US, AND BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MET WITH AL-BAYOUMI IN 1999 WHO ASSISTED THEM DURING THEIR SIX WEEK STAY IN SAN DIEGO APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. THIS CONTACT, PAIRED WITH ANALYSIS OF CALL RECORDS AND TRAVEL PATTERNS DURING THE TIME THE TWO HIJACKERS WERE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INDICATES AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY HAVE SERVED AS AN ADVANCE TEAM WHO HELPED TO ARRANGE PEOPLE TO ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR DURING THEIR TIME IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

■ FOR BACKGROUND, PRIOR TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES IN JANUARY 2000, A SERIES OF EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN THE US TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A NETWORK THAT WOULD SOON PROVIDE THEM LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE.

■ ACCORDING TO I-94 INFORMATION, ADIL ALSADHAN (BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ADEL AL SADHAN) ENTERED LOS ANGELES ON 15 DECEMBER 1998 ON (J-3)

(J-3) HIS INTENDED ADDRESS WAS THE HILTON HOTEL, LOS ANGELES AND HE LISTED A CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER ON HIS I-94 THAT WAS SUBSCRIBED TO FAHAD AL-THUMAIRY, IMAM AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA. THE PURPOSE FOR AL SADHAN'S VISIT IN 1998 IS UNKNOWN, THOUGH IT ESTABLISHES THE FIRST KNOWN CONTACT BETWEEN AL SADHAN AND AL-THUMAIRY. INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE HIS

VISIT WAS TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR AL- THUMAIRY'S SUBSEQUENT ASSISTANCE TO AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR. AL SADHAN DEPARTED LOS ANGELES ON 20 JANUARY 1999.

AL SADHAN RETURNED TO THE US ON 13 JUNE 1999, THIS TIME ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSOCIATE, MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY. BOTH MEN ENTERED VIA WASHINGTON, DC ON THE SAME FLIGHT AND

(J-3)

MUSAED AL-JARRAH, THEN DIRECTOR OF THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY HAVE MANAGED THE NETWORK THAT WOULD ASSIST AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR, THOUGH HE NEVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS. AL-JARRAH WAS STATIONED IN WASHINGTON, DC FROM 1991 TO 2005. AL-JARRAH'S OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES WERE TO MANAGE AND CONTROL ALL ASSIGNMENTS OF SAUDI IMAMS IN THE U.S. AND FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC VISAS. SOURCES REPORTED THAT AL-JARRAH MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BRING OTHER SAUDI SUNNI SALAFI EXTREMISTS INTO THE U.S. THROUGH HIS POSITION AT THE EMBASSY. IT WAS AL-JARRAH WHO DETERMINED AL-THUMAIRY'S ASSIGNMENT, PLACING HIM IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AT THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE DURING THIS TIME. AL-THUMAIRY WAS IN THE US ON A DIPLOMATIC VISA AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES. HE HAD A REPUTATION FOR BEING A "SALAFI FANATIC" AND AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MOTIVATION FOR VIOLENT OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

(A),(G),(J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

IN 1992 OR 1994 HE WAS TASKED BY USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) TO GET A LIST OF ALL SAUDI EMBASSY EMPLOYEES IN THE UNITED STATES. (A), (G), (J-1) THE REASON FOR THIS WAS TO FIND AND RECRUIT A SYMPATHIZER WITHIN THE SAUDI EMBASSY. (A), (G), (J-1) HE WENT TO A LOCAL LIBRARY AND PHOTOCOPIED A LIST OF EMBASSY EMPLOYEES FROM A BOOK IN THE REFERENCE SECTION AND HAND-DELIVERED THE LIST TO UBL. AL-JARRAH BEGAN WORKING AT THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC IN 1991. DURING THE TIME FRAME OF (A), (G), (J-1) TASKING FROM UBL, AL-JARRAH WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE PHOTOCOPIED LIST.

IN 1999, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY TRAVELED TO SAN DIEGO WHERE THEY STAYED FOR APPROXIMATELY 6 WEEKS (APPROXIMATELY JULY 1999 TO AUGUST 1999) AND MET WITH OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, A SAUDI STUDENT WHO HAD RESIDED IN SAN DIEGO SINCE 1995. AL-BAYOUMI

(O-1) AND, ACCORDING TO (A),(G),(J-1) PROVIDED A PLACE TO LIVE AND LOOKED AFTER THEM. FBI INVESTIGATION INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI MAY HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH A CELL PHONE. (A),(G),(J-1) (A),(G),(J-1) ALSO INDICATES THAT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY LIVED AT THE SAME ADDRESS IN SAN DIEGO WHERE AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR WOULD LATER STAY.

THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF AL-THUMAIRY, AL-JARRAH, AND AL-BAYOUMI IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000 IS TELLING. SPECIFICALLY, IN DECEMBER 1999 THERE WAS A UNIQUE PATTERN OF TELEPHONIC CONTACT THAT OPERATION ENCORE INVESTIGATORS REFER TO AS "THE SET-UP CALLS" CALLS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LATER PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSISTING THE HIJACKERS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

ON 12 DECEMBER 1999 ABDULLAH AL-JRAITHEN, A SAUDI RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR, ENTERED THE US IN NEW YORK AND CONTINUED TO LOS ANGELES, LISTING "HOLIDAY INN, LOS ANGELES" AS HIS INTENDED DESTINATION. AL-JRAITHEN AND AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO A TRAVELODGE HOTEL TOGETHER IN CULVER CITY, CA ON 20 DECEMBER 1999 AND CHECKED OUT THE NEXT DAY. THIS TRAVELODGE HOTEL WAS REPORTEDLY OFTEN USED BY THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE TO HOUSE VISITORS. (NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL HOTEL REGISTRATION WAS FOUND AT THIS SAME TRAVELODGE FOR ABDULLAH ALGHAMDI WHO STAYED AT THE HOTEL FROM 8 MAY 2001 TO 15 MAY 2001. AHMED ALGHAMDI AND HAZMA ALGHAMDI WERE TWO OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175 AND SAEED ALGHAMDI WAS ONE OF THE HIJACKERS ON UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93.) AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED INTO THIS SAME TRAVELODGE HOTEL AGAIN ON 9 JANUARY 2000, THE NEXT MONTH, ABOUT A WEEK PRIOR TO THE HIJACKERS' ARRIVAL. AL-BAYOUMI CHECKED IN AND THEN CHECKED OUT AFTER APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES. HE THEN CHECKED INTO THE HALF-MOON HOTEL FOR ONE NIGHT. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SEEMS TO IMPLY HE CONFUSED THE HOTELS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

WHICH INVESTIGATORS BELIEVE INDICATES AL-BAYOUMI WAS EITHER CHECKING THE MINUTES THAT WERE UNUSED ON THE CARDS OR LEARNING HOW TO USE THEM BY LISTENING TO THE AUTOMATED PROMPTS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

HIJACKERS AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR LANDED IN LOS ANGELES ON 15 JANUARY 2000. THE FIRST PLACE THEY VISITED WAS THE KING FAHAD MOSQUE IN CULVER CITY, CA WHERE AL-THUMAIRY WAS THE IMAM. IN LATE JANUARY 2000, THEY MET OMAR AL-BAYOUMI IN LOS ANGELES AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER MOVED TO SAN DIEGO, WHERE AL-BAYOUMI RESIDED. AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED A RENTAL LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS IN SAN DIEGO AND ASSISTED THEM IN SETTING UP BANK ACCOUNTS.

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

TELEPHONE RECORDS SHOW THAT AL-BAYOUMI CALLED MUTAIB AL SUDAIRY FIVE TIMES SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING THE HIJACKERS IN LOS ANGELES. THE DATES OF THE CALLS ARE SIGNIFICANT. THE FIRST SET OF CALLS OCCURRED ON 24 JANUARY, 26 JANUARY, AND 30 JANUARY 2000 ON THESE PARTICULAR DAYS AL-BAYOUMI MET THE HIJACKERS IN CULVER CITY, CA AND TALKED TO THEM ABOUT COMING TO SAN DIEGO. THE NEXT CALL OCCURRED ON 2 FEBRUARY 2000. ON 4 FEBRUARY 2000 AL-BAYOUMI CO-SIGNED THE LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE HIJACKERS' APARTMENT AND BROUGHT THEM TO A BANK OF AMERICA TO ASSIST IN OPENING A BANK ACCOUNT. THE LAST CALL OCCURRED ON 7 FEBRUARY 2000. BY THIS DATE, ALL OF AL-HAZMI AND AL-MIHDHAR'S AFFAIRS WERE IN ORDER.

SOMETIME IN 2000, AL SADHAN MOVED TO LAWRENCE, KANSAS AND AL SUDAIRY MOVED TO COLUMBUS, MISSOURI. WHILE IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY LIVED WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL FOR ABOUT FOUR MONTHS IN 2000. KHALEEL WAS A KNOWN KEY COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICER FOR UBL AND PROVIDED SATELLITE PHONES USED IN THE 1998 US EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN AFRICA. DURING HIS TIME IN MISSOURI, AL SUDAIRY ATTENDED THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI - COLUMBIA'S INTENSIVE ENGLISH PROGRAM. ACCORDING TO (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) FACULTY MEMBERS WERE SUSPICIOUS OF HIM SINCE HE DIDN'T APPEAR INTERESTED IN LEARNING ENGLISH AND HIS PEERS BELIEVED HE WAS A SAUDI ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICER.

ON 12/8/2000, A THIRD HIJACKER, HANI HANJOUR, ARRIVED IN SAN DIEGO AND LEFT WITH AL-HAZMI FOR PHOENIX, ARIZONA.

IN EARLY APRIL OF 2001, AL-HAZMI AND HANJOUR ARRIVED IN FALLS CHURCH, VA. THEY ATTENDED THE DAR AL HIJRA MOSQUE, WHERE

ANWAR AULAQI WAS NOW THE IMAM. ALSO IN APRIL OF 2001, BOTH AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY WERE TERMINATED FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE ISLAMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT AT THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY (NFI). THE TWO MEN, AT THIS POINT, WERE LIVING IN WASHINGTON, DC. FBI HAS NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT AL SADHAN AND/OR AL SUDAIRY HAD CONTACT WITH THE HIJACKERS OR AULAQI DURING THIS TIME. AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY BOTH LEFT THE UNITED STATES AND RETURNED TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 10/25/2001.

RECENT INFORMATION/INVESTIGATION

(J-3)

BECAUSE THE FBI ASSESSES THAT AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY MAY STILL MAINTAIN TIES TO AL-QAEDA AND MAY BE (J-3) FOR FACILITATION OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PURPOSES ON BEHALF OF AL-QAEDA,

(J-3), (O-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

SURROUND AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S CURRENT NEXUS TO AL-QAEDA AND THEIR ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTING THE US IN 2001. BEYOND THEIR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY PATTERNS PRIOR TO 9/11, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT (A), (G), (J-1)

INFORMATION THAT THEY WERE WORKING AT THE BEHEST OF AL-QAEDA. THE ONLY IDENTIFIED DIRECT LINK TO AL- QAEDA BEYOND THE OPERATION ENCORE NETWORK IS THROUGH AL SUAIDRY'S ASSOCIATION WITH ZIYAD KHALEEL, WHO WAS KILLED IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2002. SUBSEQUENT TO AL SUDAIRY'S DEPARTURE FROM THE US IN 2001, HE MET WITH KHALEEL TWICE IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

(J-3)

(J-3)

(A),(G),(J-1)

(A),(G),(J-1)

HE HAS NEVER TRAVELED TO THE US BEFORE.

[REDACTED] IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] (O-1) REPORTING INDICATES THAT IN NOVEMBER 2009, AL-BAYOUMI WIRED \$6,000.00 TO A FLIGHT SCHOOL LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SPECIALIZES IN SMALL AIRCRAFT (CESSNA) FLIGHT TRAINING. AL-BAYOUMI PROVIDED A LIST OF IDENTIFIERS FOR THIS MONETARY TRANSACTION, TO INCLUDE A P.O. BOX LOCATED IN SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS TWO SAUDI TELEPHONE NUMBERS. ONE OF THESE NUMBERS APPEARS TO BE LINKED TO A CIVIL AVIATION AGENCY IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHOM AL-BAYOUMI MAY WORK FOR. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM A CURRENT LINK BETWEEN AL-BAYOUMI AND AL SADHAN OR AL SUDAIRY, THE ABOVE INFORMATION REMAINS OF CONCERN TO OUR BUREAU.

[REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION OUTLINES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] AL SADHAN AND AL SUDAIRY'S PREVIOUS VISIT TO THE US, IN WHICH THEY VISITED VIRGINIA, CALIFORNIA, AND KANSAS/MISSOURI.

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

(J-3) THE FBI BELIEVES THAT TO BE AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO, AND THAT BOTH SUBJECTS WILL LIKELY OBTAIN (J-3) HOUSING. REGARDLESS, WHEN SUBJECTS ESTABLISH A RESIDENCE,

(A),(G),(J-1)

HUMINT

FBI

(A), (G), (J-1)

(J-3)

TO FUNCTION AS AN EXTENSION OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAMS.

FBI (G) SOURCE COVERAGE WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SUBJECTS UPON ARRIVAL, E.G. IF THEY ATTEND MOSQUE AND WHAT HUMINT COVERAGE IS ALREADY IN PLACE IN THAT LOCATION. CURRENT (A),(G),(J-1) WILL BE QUERIED.

ADDITIONALLY, (G) IS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI INVESTIGATION TO LOOK FOR CONTACTS AND LOCATIONS FREQUENTED DURING THE TIME HE SPENT IN (G)

ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS

GIVEN THE SUBJECTS' SUSPECTED HISTORY OF FACILITATION, THE FBI ANTICIPATES OPENING ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS BASED ON ANY US-BASED ASSOCIATES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED BY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE.

(A), (G), (J-1)

CONCLUSION

THE FBI ASSESSES THAT

(A), (G), (J-1)

THE FBI APPRECIATES YOUR AGENCY'S ASSISTANCE IN THIS ONGOING INVESTIGATION AND WELCOMES ANY INFORMATION YOUR AGENCY MAY HAVE IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECTS OF OPERATION ENCORE.

THE FBI IS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO YOUR AGENCY FOR LEAD PURPOSES. AUTHORIZATION FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION TO OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND/OR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS MUST BE PROVIDED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS.

POC FOR THIS MATTER AT THE FBI IS IA (S) AT

(S) OR SSA (G),(S)

(G)

EO 14040-
000651-655

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Diego, California 92123
February 10, 2004

OMAR ABDI MOHAMED,

(A), (G), (J-1)

Investigative Summary: (G)

(G), advised that OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, also known as Omar Abdi Mohamed AlKhadib, was born on (P-1), in Mogadishu, Somalia. MOHAMED was a resident of Canada from 1990 to 1995. His last known address in Canada was (P-1) Ontario. His telephone number at that address was (P-1). MOHAMED was allowed entry into the United States on July 8, 1995. His status at that time was SR-1 (Lawful Alien Permanent Resident - Religious Worker). That status was granted as the result of being offered employment by Masjidul Taqwa (Islamic Institution), 2575 Imperial Avenue, San Diego, CA 92101, telephone (619) 239-6738. The offer was made by (P). On April 11, 2000, MOHAMED submitted his Application for Naturalization to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

(A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR MOHAMED of San Diego, was selected as the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) leader in the United States in early 2000. (A), (G), (J-1) stated that members of the AIAI are very secretive. A close friend of (A), (G), (J-1) advised that AIAI raises large amounts of money in the United States and transfers it to Somalia (A), (G), (J-1).

AIAI is an international terrorist organization, directed and financially supported by a foreign power as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines (AGG). AIAI is a faction of a foreign nation and a political organization that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof, which is not substantially composed of United States citizens.

AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. A terrorist threat summary received from members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) suggested that the AIAI is developing cells of supporters in the U.S. primarily responsible for fund-raising and at a future date, possible attacks directed at U.S. targets. One of the goals of the AIAI is to seize the Ogaden region of Ethiopia by force and form an Islamic state composed of Ogaden and Somalia. (G), has reported that

[REDACTED]

AIAI makes extensive use of non-government organizations (NGOs) for its money laundering and fund-raising activities.

[REDACTED] According to FBIHQ, AIAI believes the U.S. and other western nations support the Ethiopian Government. Therefore, attacks on U.S. citizens and Western interests overseas are possibilities. Intelligence also reports that AIAI threatened unspecified attacks on [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) in Addis Ababa in December 1996.

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] UBL purchased shares in the Al-Barakat company currently managed by AIAI. AIAI is believed to use Al-Barakaat to finance its operations. UBL asked SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AHMAD GASSIM (OR QASIM), who resides in Saudi Arabia, and SHAYKH MUHAMMAD UTHAM, who owns the Amal Bank, to take over the management of the Al Barakat company as they are both high- ranking members with AIAI. The Al-Barakat company owns the Halima Rouge Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya and uses it as a clearing station for weapons to be sent to the various AIAI groups. The AIAI fighters and group members use the hotel as a base until they are given their travel orders.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) advised that during early July, 2000, a meeting of Islamic fundamentalist leaders took place at the "Omar" mosque in Los Angeles, CA. OMAR KHADIB and [REDACTED] (P) among others attended the meeting in Los Angeles. KHADIB was a close associate of [REDACTED] (P) (A), (G), (J-1) advised that [REDACTED] (P) sponsored MOHAMED when he came to San Diego from Canada. The attendees discussed what steps could be taken to assist the expansion of fundamentalist beliefs in America, including fund-raising for Islamic causes. These causes include building more mosques in the U.S. and supporting Islamic groups in foreign countries such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It was also discussed that America is an

[REDACTED]

enemy of Islam because it provides support to enemies of Islam, especially Israel.

[REDACTED] On (A), (G), (J-1) 2001, (A), (G), (J-1) (P) advised that a prominent Somali community leader, (P) alleged that KHADIB was actively providing financial support to an unnamed terrorist organization outside the U.S. (P) was astounded that the FBI had not arrested KHADIB and guessed that KHADIB must

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(C-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In (O-1) (O-1) in the first part of 2000, MOHAMED WALI was at the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. (O-1)

[REDACTED] (O-1) he was a member of Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI), but now was a member of USAMA BIN LADEN's AL-QAEDA network. AL-QAEDA was well-funded and well-organized. WALI's job was to recruit Somalis to join AL-QAEDA to fight against the West.

[REDACTED] WALI, a Somali national, was described as 38 - 40 years old, tall, thin, bowlegged, strong hands and legs. He has a gray patch of hair in the front of his scalp, which was surrounded by dark hair. He is married and has five children. He has a Master's Degree and is working on his PhD in economics. He lives in the northeast section of Mecca, called Azizia.

[REDACTED] WALI spoke about a very close friend, OMAR KADIB (spelling), who was also a member of AL-QAEDA. KADIB was like a brother to WALI. They meet each other once or twice a year

[REDACTED]

in places such as Mecca and Nairobi, Kenya. WALI gave KADIB's telephone number to (O-1) and told (O-1) to call KADIB. WALI, (O-1) and KADIB are from the Ogaden tribe.

(O-1)

[REDACTED]

(O-1) identified ABDIAZIZ LNU another AL-QAEDA member who lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. (O-1) met ABDIAZIZ at WALI's house in Mecca during the Hajj.

[REDACTED] Minneapolis FBI advised that the AIAI had a meeting of its United States leaders in Minneapolis, Minnesota over the September 2001, Labor Day weekend. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OMAR AL-BAYOUMI, a Saudi Arabian national and a subject in the PENTTBOMB investigation, has been linked to at least two of the hijackers, NAWAF AL-HAZMI and KHALID AL-MIDHAR. AL-BAYOUMI has provided financial and logistical support to AL-HAZMI and AL-MIDHAR while they were in San Diego during 2000. Reliable assets and other members of the San Diego Muslim community believe that AL-BAYOUMI works for the Saudi intelligence service.

[REDACTED] Investigation in San Diego has located documents belonging to AL-BAYOUMI, which contained a telephone list with an entry, OMAR AL-KHATEEB (spelling), telephone numbers (P) and (P). Also on scrap papers were notations for OMAR AL-KHATIB, pager number, (P) and (P). Also noted was an E-mail address: (P). On January 25, 2000, telephone records for AL-BAYOUMI showed a call to (P), which has been used by OMAR KHADIB.

[REDACTED] On 09/17/2001, OMAR KHADIB, who was one of many Muslim community leaders interviewed regarding the 09/11/2001 hijackings, insisted that he had no association with the Arab community and that the Somalis consider themselves African-American, not Middle-Easterners.

(A), (G), (J-1) advised that OMAR KHADIB has been seen having lunch with AL-BAYOUMI on numerous occasions. (A), (G), (J-1) advised that KHADIB received a monthly stipend (A), (G), (J-1) from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs. KHADIB was described as an extremely radical Muslim fundamentalist who was barred from various mosques for being too radical, i.e., advocating toppling various governments, including Saudi Arabia. KHADIB was an AIAI leader, then was kicked out of the group for being too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues. KHADIB formed a radical Muslim splinter group whose name is unknown to (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (O-1)

has indicated that KHADIB closed the Western Somali Relief Agency (WESRA), but still operates the East African Youth Center in San Diego, California. The closing of WESRA appeared to coincide with the shutdown of the Chicago-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury. (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

Investigation at San Diego determined that MOHAMED has a wife and child in Australia. (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1) the possible name of MOHAMED's wife as Reisa Bannerman.

During a recent interview with MOHAMED, he admitted to having family in Australia. MOHAMED also stated that he often traveled to Australia, and most recently, used Australia as a stop-over point while he applied for travel Visa's to Africa. (MOHAMED did not state which African countries he was attempting to visit.)

Financial investigation into any possible financial transactions between MOHAMED and Australia are currently ongoing and have not been fully analyzed.

The following information is known regarding OMAR ABDI MOHAMED:

Name:	OMAR ABDI MOHAMED, AKA OMAR KHADIB
Sex:	
Date of Birth:	(P-1) 1960
Place of Birth:	Somalia
SSN:	(P-1)
CADLN	(P-1)
INS A#:	(P-1)
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	180lbs.
Hair:	Black
Eyes:	Black
Residence:	(P) La Mesa, CA 91941
	(P)
Occupation:	President, Somali and East African Youth Center 4979 University Avenue, #D, San Diego, CA 92105 (619) 282-0711

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DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/

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HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL/PRIORITY/
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JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK/PRIORITY/
JFIC NORFOLK VA/PRIORITY/
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US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC//HQ INTEL//PRIORITY/
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//CS551//PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC/PRIORITY/
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC//OHS BOX//PRIORITY/

BT

(G)

SERIAL: IIR XXXYYY
COUNTRY: UNITED STATES (US); CANADA (CA); SOMALIA (SO); ETHIOPIA
(ET); YE
IPSP: (G)
SUBJ: 1. INFORMATION ON SOMALI COMMUNITY IN SAN DIEGO

(F)

REPORT CLASSIFIED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(G)

EO14040-000674

(A), (G), (J-1)

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. SOURCE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON CURRENT ACTIVITIES**
MOHDAR ABDULLAH, [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (P)

2. [REDACTED] WHEN OMAR ABDI ((MOHAMED)), AKA OMAR KHADIB, LIVED IN CANADA, HE WAS AN OUTSPOKEN PROPONENT OF JIHAD AGAINST NON-MUSLIM MOVEMENTS IN SOMALIA. (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED LIVED IN CANADA FROM 1990 TO 1995.) SPECIFICALLY, MOHAMED SUPPORTED ARMED ACTIONS AGAINST ETHIOPIA AND CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS IN SOMALIA. MOHAMED BELIEVED JIHAD WAS THE ONLY WAY TO UNITE SOMALIS BEHIND FORMING A UNIFIED ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT.

3. [REDACTED] AFTER MOVING TO SAN DIEGO IN 1995, MOHAMED BRAGGED TO THE CITY'S SOMALI COMMUNITY ABOUT WORKING FOR THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (SOURCE COMMENT: WORKING FOR THE MINISTRY WAS PRESTIGIOUS BECAUSE ONE WAS PAID DIRECTLY BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, AS OPPOSED TO INDIRECTLY THROUGH SAUDI-SUPPORTED CHARITIES. IN ORDER TO WORK FOR THE MINISTRY ONE HAD TO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN A SAUDI-SUPPORTED MADRASSA AND RECOMMENDED BY AN INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC SCHOLAR. THE MINISTRY ALLOWED ONE TO CHOOSE THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH TO WORK. IN THE UNITED STATES, MINISTRY WORKERS REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.)

4. [REDACTED] MOHAMED'S POINT OF CONTACT AT THE MINISTRY WAS KHALED ((AL-SOWA [REDACTED])). AL-SO
OF ABOUT (A)(G)(J-1) PEOPLE. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

6. [REDACTED] (FBI COMMENT: MOHAMED WAS ARRESTED ON 20 JANUARY 2004 FOR IMMIGRATION FRAUD. MOHAMED ORIGINALLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS AGENCY IN 2000 WHEN HE WAS IDENTIFIED BY (A), (G), (J-1) RELIABLE SOURCES AS A LEADER OF THE AL-ITTIHAD AL ISLAMIA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS LATER REMOVED FROM THIS POSITION OF LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE WAS VIEWED BY OTHER MEMBERS AS TOO RADICAL.)

7. [REDACTED] A NON-USPER IN SAN DIEGO WAS ALSO PAID BY THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF DAWA AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: THIS INDIVIDUAL IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE SUBJECT OF AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION.) THE NON-USPER IS A SOMALI WHO WAS BORN IN THE OGADEN REGION OF ETHIOPIA. HIS FATHER IS A PROMINENT ISLAMIC SCHOLAR IN DJIBOUTI, AND HE STUDIED ISLAM IN A MADRASSA IN SAUDI ARABIA. HE CAME TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER 2001 AND REQUESTED POLITICAL ASYLUM. A LAWYER, FNU ((JABREEL)), HELPED HIM TO FILL OUT HIS ASYLUM CLAIM AND CONVINCED HIM TO CLAIM THAT HE WAS FROM DJIBOUTI, NOT ETHIOPIA. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOMALI COMMUNITY THAT THE NON-USPER IS ACTUALLY FROM ETHIOPIA. JABREEL HAS SINCE BEEN DEPORTED FROM THE US.

8. [REDACTED] THE NON-USPER USED TO REPORT TO A SAUDI MINISTRY OFFICER NAMED FAHAD ((ALTHUMAIRY)). ALTHUMAIRY WORKED OUT OF THE SAUDI CONSULATE IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, AND OVERSAW THE DISBURSEMENT OF SAUDI MONEY TO SAUDI RELIGIOUS WORKERS IN SAN DIEGO. AT ONE POINT ALTHUMAIRY BECAME ANGRY WITH THE NON-USPER BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD A JOB, IN ADDITION TO BEING PAID BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. ALTHUMAIRY BELIEVED THAT THE NON-USPER SHOULD ONLY WORK FOR THE MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS. (FBI COMMENT: ALTHUMAIRY LEFT THE UNITED STATES FOR SAUDI ARABIA IN FEBRUARY 2003. IN MAY 2003 HE ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENTER THE UNITED STATES BUT WAS DENIED ENTRY.)

9. [REDACTED] MOHDAR ((ABDULLAH)) WAS DEPORTED TO YEMEN. (FBI COMMENT: MOHDAR

(A), (G), (J-1)

(G) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] WAS AN ASSOCIATE OF 9/11 HIJACKERS KHALID ((AL-MIDHAR)) AND NAWAF ((AL-HAZMI)) WHEN THEY LIVED IN SAN DIEGO. (P) [REDACTED] MOHDAR HAD RENTED AN APARTMENT FROM (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] WHEN HE WAS LIVING IN SAN DIEGO. MOHDAR CALLED (P) [REDACTED] SEVERAL TIMES AT HIS HOME AND ON HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE. HE WANTED (P) [REDACTED] TO JOIN HIM AS A PARTNER IN AN IMPORT/EXPORT BUSINESS. (P) [REDACTED] WAS VERY ANGRY THAT MOHDAR KEPT TRYING TO CONTACT (P) [REDACTED] AND FORBID (P) [REDACTED] TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM. ((G)) [REDACTED] COMMENT: MANY PEOPLE IN THE SAN DIEGO MUSLIM COMMUNITY FEEL THAT MOHDAR IS NOTHING BUT TROUBLE AND SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE.)

10. [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] IS RUNNING A CHARITY CALLED (P) [REDACTED] HE WANTED TO CLOSE THE CHARITY DOWN, BUT WAS URGED BY (P) [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] TO KEEP IT OPERATIONAL. (P) [REDACTED] HIMSELF HAD BEEN DENIED HIS APPLICATION TO OPEN A TAX EXEMPT NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION AND WANTED TO USE (P) [REDACTED] AND (P) [REDACTED]

FD-36a (Rev. 1-31-2003)

AS HIS PERSONAL FUND RAISING ORGANIZATION. (P) WAS RESISTANT TO THE IDEA OF BEING (P) PUPPET BUT (P) CONVINCED HIS FATHER TO KEEP (P) OPEN FOR (P) BECAUS (P) WORKED FOR (P) AT HIS (P) AND THOUGHT (P) WAS A GOOD GUY. (SOURCE COMMENT: (P) IS VERY INVOLVED IN FUND RAISING AND CHARITABLE CAUSES, BUT HE IS NOT A RADICAL. HE IS VERY NAIVE AND EASILY MANIPULATED OUT OF HIS DESIRE TO HELP POOR AND NEEDY MUSLIMS WORLDWIDE.)

COMMENTS: 1. (P) FBI COMMENTS: OMAR ABDI MOHAMED IS THE SUBJECT OF (F) (P), (A), (G), (J-1) (P).

2. (G) FBI COMMENTS.

INST: US YES. CONTACT FBIHQ POC FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

PREP: FBIHQ POC (S)

(G)

EO14040-000677

EO 14040-
000692-695

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/18/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)

(S)

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis:

San Diego portion of lead 21.1 covered

(G)

Reference:

(F)

Details:

Reference above captioned case and serial which set forth lead to advise (G) of action pertaining to identified Saudi government supported propagators in San Diego division.

(P) (G) identified Omar Abdi Mohamed, (P) and Abdimagid M. Omar, as three Saudi supported propagators living in San Diego Division. Investigative updates for mentioned propagators follows:

(P)

(P)

is currently

(A), (G), (J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

(P)

(P)

(P)

had been, through his fund raising activities for (P)

EO14040-000692

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/18/2004

actively participating in the financial and material support of Hamas in violation of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. [REDACTED] (P) had been a paid fund raiser for [REDACTED] (P) traveling throughout the U.S. for this purpose. The [REDACTED] (P) was shut down by the USG on 12/04/2001 due to its Hamas fund-raising connections.

[REDACTED] The FBI Los Angeles division is investigating source allegations that the King Fahd Mosque and/or some of its leaders received UBL money, then sent the money to San Diego, including to [REDACTED] (P). These funds were distributed through LA subject Fahd Al Thumairy. Financial records for [REDACTED] (P)'s personal and business accounts have been requested, received and analyzed, to determine the money trail of these funds. Financial information has been uploaded [REDACTED] (G)

[REDACTED] The financial analysis of the [REDACTED] (P) personal and business bank records has indicated at least one source of funds from Saudi Arabia, and a lead to Riyadh was sent to identify the originator individual or organization. The analysis also revealed funds received by [REDACTED] (P) from LA subject Al Thumairy, referenced above.

[REDACTED] SD is awaiting response from leads sent to Riyadh and to LA to follow up on the source of the Saudi funds, and the veracity of the original LA source allegation regarding the involvement of UBL money funneled through LA subject Al Thumairy and the Kind Fahd Mosque.

Omar Abdi Mohamed

[REDACTED] Omar Abdi Mohamed is the current subject of a San Diego FFI. This FFI was initiated on information that (A), (G), (J-1) reliable [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) sources identified Mohamed as the leader of the Al-Ittihad al Islamia (AIAI) in the United States. AIAI was previously identified by FBIHQ as an Islamic extremist group active in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Northeastern Kenya. Later investigation indicated that Mohamed was removed from leadership of the AIAI because he was too radical, especially over Ethiopian issues.

[REDACTED] On January 20, 2004, Mohamed was arrested for immigration fraud. Investigation by San Diego JTTF determined that Mohamed was in charge of the "Western Somali Relief Agency" (WSRA).

WSRA was a fund raising entity that allegedly provided drought and humanitarian relief money to the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. During a US naturalization interview, Mohamed lied about receiving approximately \$350,000 from Global Relief Foundation. The US

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/18/2004

Treasury Department has frozen the Global Relief Foundation's assets and accused it of providing financial support to terrorism. Mohamed is currently in Federal custody in San Diego.

[REDACTED] Referenced EC accurately reflected Mohamed's known association with the Saudi Arabian IFTA office.

[REDACTED] All of Mohamed's known bank accounts have been subpoenaed and final financial analysis is being completed by FBI and ICE financial analysts. Investigative financial leads pertaining to final analysis of bank records will be set as appropriate.

(A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Mohamed remains in federal custody and has shown no inclination to communicate with the prosecution.

Abdimagid Mohamed Omar

[REDACTED] Omar was not previously known to be a recipient IFTA funding. San Diego is [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) to fully identify Omar. It is probable that San Diego will [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1) Omar to attempt to determine his ties to the San Diego Muslim community and to the Saudi Arabian government.

[REDACTED]
To: Counterterrorism From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F), 06/18/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] Read and Clear.

♦♦

EO 14040-
000699-714

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/23/2007

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

(G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)
(S)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(G)

(S)

(G)

Attn:

(G)

(S)

(G)

Attn:

(G)

Riyadh

Attn:

(G)

Sanaa

Attn:

(G)

EO14040-000699

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ottawa

Attn: (G)

San Diego

Attn: (S)

Los Angeles

Attn: (S)

Washington Field

Attn: (G)

New York

Attn: (G)

From: New

(G)

ct:

(S)

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

(S)

Case ID #:

(F)

Title:

OPERATION ENCORE

(A),(G),(J-1)

Synopsis:

Initiate a Full Investigation (FI) on the below-described group.

(G)

Enclosure(s):

1 - Opening LHM

1 - (G) submitted under separate cover

EO14040-000700

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) [REDACTED] 10/23/2007

Full Investigation Initiated: 10/23/2007

Reference: [REDACTED] (F)

Details: [REDACTED] Administrative Note: New York is opening the captioned FI based on information developed during interviews and investigation conducted under the auspices of the referenced investigation. Due to logistical constraints related to uploading to any PENTTBOM file and the evolved nature of the instant investigation, all future documentation related to such referenced investigation should be uploaded to the captioned case file.

[REDACTED] Background: On 06/28/2007, New York opened a subfile under the PENTTBOM investigation to contain information garnered from the planned exploitation of intelligence targets, which were previously identified during the PENTTBOM investigation. The PENTTBOM investigation had functioned as both a criminal investigation and an intelligence gathering operation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, there remained individuals with various levels of connectivity to the 9/11 hijackers whom could be further exploited for additional intelligence value. By revisiting some aspects of the PENTTBOM investigation, New York believed that certain Al Qa'ida (AQ) tactics and tradecraft could be revealed.

[REDACTED] Specifically, New York sought to gain a greater understanding of 9/11 hijackers KHALID AL-MIHDHAR and NAWAF AL-HAZMI's past interaction with and connectivity to the local (i.e. southern Californian) Muslim community. Such an understanding would assist in explaining the apparent ease with which AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI exploited that community to gain support and safe harbor.

[REDACTED] Results: Over the past two months, writers interviewed multiple individuals related to the PENTTBOM investigation. The results of such interviews as well as additional analytical investigation has provided significant insight into i) how AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have "plugged into" the local community so quickly, ii) what other objectives AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have had in addition to preparation for the 9/11 plot, and iii) additional individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during late 1999 and early 2000.

[REDACTED] **Exploitation of Muslim Community:** Multiple San Diego sources and other individuals associated with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI during their time in southern California believed that the two hijackers must have been given "tazkia" prior to arriving in the United States. Tazkia is generally defined as a "recommendation" or "voucher" depending on the context. According to such sources,

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
 Re: (F) 10/23/2007

AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would have been given tazkia in a letter format to present to a certain individual (currently unidentified) or may simply have been given a name of an individual to visit upon their arrival. Such individual would then, because of this individual's relationship with the tazkia-provider, have provided any and all assistance that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI would need during their time in the United States (see (F)). At this time, it is unknown who would have been the tazkia-provider or to whom the tazkia-provider would have directed AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI to visit. (P) believed that it was likely a person or multiple persons who had access to both the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, California and the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, as support from both communities would have been necessary for success (see (F)). It is important to note that the individual to whom AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were directed, would not have necessarily known for what reason or purpose AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were to receive assistance. In fact, as the above sources described, the nature of tazkia, in general, is to function as a carte blanche, no-questions-asked method for receiving assistance.

One individual reported to have had contact with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI is FAHAD AL-THUMARY, main subject in (F). AL-THUMARY was an Imam at the King Fahd Mosque (KFM) in Culver City, California and was described in U.S. State Department documentation as an Administrative Officer at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Los Angeles, California (Consulate) (F). Additional documentation

(C-1)

(F)

AL-THUMARY was previously a main subject of an FI based on his association with OMAR AL-BAYOUMI (through phone connectivity) and his (AL-THUMARY's) potential association with AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI (F)

(F)

(F)

According to the closing EC and supplemental closing EC, the FI was closed due to:

(A), (G), (J-1)

the U.S. Attorney's Office conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute AL-THUMARY at such time. However, a review of AL-THUMARY's case file does not appear to reveal any investigation into AL-THUMARY as a potential "tazkia" contact for AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI. It is unlikely that this was investigated as the existence of such a protocol, as well as the fact that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

may have utilized such a protocol to "plug into" the local Muslim community, appears to have been unknown at such time.

[REDACTED] If AL-THUMARY played any part in providing assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI after receiving tazkia from another individual(s) or in providing tazkia for AL-MIHDHAR and/or AL-HAZMI so that they could receive assistance from another individual(s), there may have been telephonic contact between AL-THUMARY and such individual(s). A review of AL-THUMARY's known telephone records for the time period immediately prior to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI arriving in the U.S. is particularly instructive.

[REDACTED] During a three-day period at the end of December 1999, approximately two and a half weeks prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, AL-THUMARY made a number of phone calls that are significant in that the pattern of contact, including individuals and frequency, does not appear to have been duplicated prior to nor after this date. The report below documents this pattern:

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Prior to 12/27/1999 and after 12/29/1999, AL-THUMARY does not appear to have had additional telephonic contact

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

with [REDACTED] (P) (main subject of [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (P) had just two months prior to this contact moved from [REDACTED] (P) to San Diego, California. It is still unclear why a [REDACTED] (P) student living in San Diego would [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) located in Los Angeles. Nor is it clear how the two would have been first introduced.

[REDACTED] (P) became a subject of interest, due to contact with telephone number 967-1-200578 on 03/02/2000, which was only recently revealed. This telephone number first came to the FBI's attention shortly after AQ's attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 08/07/1998. KHALED RASHEED DAOUD AL-OWHALI, one of the two suicide attackers in Nairobi, survived the attack and called this number for assistance in fleeing Kenya. AL-OWHALI was later captured in Kenya and identified this number during his confession to the FBI, at which time he admitted to calling this number both before and after the attack.

[REDACTED] Subsequent investigation determined that this number was located in Sanaa, Yemen, and subscribed to by AHMAD AL-HADA. Telephone number 967-1-200578 also emerged in the main PENTTBOM investigation. Soon after the terrorist attacks on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED] (P) However, the contact between [REDACTED] (P) telephone number and this Yemeni number was the first recorded contact with or by any individual or group in southern California.

[REDACTED] According to Telephone Applications (TA), AL- YOUMI and AL-THUMARY's first telephonic contact is on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (U)

[REDACTED] to the Ar-Ribat Mosque, at which AL-BAYOUMI performed administrative duties, is included) between AL-BAYOUMI and AL-THUMARY, with the majority of such calls occurring in the [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) In an interview of AL-BAYOUMI on 08/18/2003, AL-BAYOUMI states that he knew AL-THUMARY from the KFM but was unaware that AL-THUMARY also worked at the Consulate [REDACTED] (F).

[REDACTED] ANWAR AULAQI was the imam at the Ar-Ribat Mosque during the time AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were living in San Diego. Both AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were known to attend the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

Ar-Ribat Mosque and were associated with AULAQI. The full extent of their relationship is still unknown.

(A),(G),(J-1),(D)

[REDACTED] During a recent interview, AULAQI advised that he did not know AL-THUMARY (F)

[REDACTED] The three telephone numbers which are attributed to the SAE or a department within the SAE appear to be linked. Telephone number 202-494-2777 is subscribed to by the SAE, however the number is a cell phone number. In the personal phonebook of AL-BAYOUMI, telephone number 202-494-2777 is attributed to KHALID ASSWAILEM ([REDACTED] (F)). In an interview conducted on 10/25/2001, ASSWAILEM described himself as the "Islamic Affairs Attache" at the SAE ([REDACTED] (F)). In the same interview, ASSWAILEM details the personal relationship that he had with AL-BAYOUMI, which included AL-BAYOUMI seeking support for "scholarship funds."

[REDACTED] The other telephone numbers 202-342-3700 and 202-944-3192 are described as the main number and the fax number, respectively, for the Islamic Affairs Department (IFTA) of the SAE ([REDACTED] (F)). The same serial states that MUSAED AL-JARRAH, described by the SAE as an accountant was, in fact, the director of the Islamic Affairs Department of the SAE and is suspected of being an intelligence officer. AL-JARRAH reportedly left his post in 2005 after serving approximately fourteen years in such position. ([REDACTED] (O-1))

" ([REDACTED] (O-1)) AL-JARRAH may have been trying to bring other Saudi Sunni Salafi extremists into the United States through his position at the [Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (EKSA)]. AL-JARRAH's official responsibilities are to manage and control all assignments of Saudi Imams (clerics) in the United States and facilitate the issuance of diplomatic visas to these individuals. Saudi Imams who are assigned to the United States through this process report to AL-JARRAH and he serves as the coordinator of their activity while they are inside the United States. AL-JARRAH is purposely selecting Saudi Salafi extremists to be assigned to the United States ([REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1))

(A)(G)(J-1)

(A)(G)(J-1)

AL-JARRAH

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (F) 10/23/2007

travels in and around the United States visiting the Saudi Imams under his control. It should be noted that AL-JARRAH is listed as an accountant for the EKSA on the United States Department of State diplomat's list.

(O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was heavily connected/linked to Saudi Sunni extremists operating inside the United States, specifically with the Southern California based network of [MOHAMMED] AL-MUHANNAH and AL-THUMAIRY [AL-THUMARY. (O-1) [REDACTED] AL-JARRAH was in fact a controlling, guiding and directing influence on all aspects of Sunni extremist activity in Southern California and has been directing, controlling and funding AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY since their arrival in the United States. The removals of AL-MUHANNA and AL-THUMAIRY, which was done at the behest of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, (O-1) [REDACTED]

(O-1) [REDACTED] On 01/22/2004, during the arrest of OMAR ABDI MOHAMED (main subject of (F) [REDACTED] on immigration charges, a search was conducted on MOHAMED's residence. During the search, several documents with letterhead from the IFTA office of the SAE were seized by the investigating agents. Among the documents, was a notice of a personnel change, dated January 17, 1998, which was sent to "inform you that the Director of Dawa for Europe, America and Australia has approved the nomination of Sheik Fahd bin Ibrahim AlThumairi to oversee the Propagators working in the state of California"

(F) [REDACTED]

(A), (G), (J-1), (D)

[REDACTED]

(A)(G)(J-1) [REDACTED] prior investigation indicated that AL-THUMARY controlled a Wells Fargo account that "primarily serve[d] the purpose of receiving funds from individuals in Saudi Arabia and distributing those funds to a few recipients"

[REDACTED]

EO14040-000706

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
 Re: (F) 10/23/2007

(F) . The distribution functioned as follows, "[e]ach time a large wire was received, checks were written and cash withdrawals were made from the account until the account's balance was depleted...[a]t that time, the next large wire transfer was received and the cycle was repeated" (F)

During the period that this account was examined, 06/10/1999 to 11/15/2002, (P) (A), (G), (J-1) and the (P) owned by (P) received (P) from AL-THUMARY. (P) also the president of (P), had previously been associated with members of the Somali-based terrorist organization, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamia (AIAI). At the time of MOHDAR ABDULLAH's (F) arrest in 2001, ABDULLAH possessed (P) business card with the phone number (P) on his person.

(A), (G), (J-1) indicated that MOHAMED, a Somali extremist who immigrated from Toronto, Canada to San Diego, California in 1995 (F) also received a portion of the Saudi largesse for his activities. MOHAMED was selected as the AIAI leader in the U.S. in the beginning of 2000 (F) (F). NOTE: AIAI is a Somali-based terrorist organization which rose to power in the early 1990s (according to DHS's Terrorist Reference Guide from 2004) and is designated a (G) terrorist group on the FBI's (G) MOHAMMED, (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) received a stipend of approximately (A), (G), (J-1) per month from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Islamic Affairs (F) Based on some of the above (A), (G), (J-1) (A), (G), (J-1) it seems likely this stipend was administered by AL-THUMARY or AL-JARRAH.

However, even with such extensive contact with AL-JARRAH and what appears to have been an appointment as the sole distributor of funds in California, AL-THUMARY may have been competing for such funds with AL-BAYOUMI. (A), (G), (J-1) interviewed on (A), (G), (J-1) reported that "AlBayoumi fought with AlThumairy because AlBayoumi wanted to be the point of contact for disbursing IFTA money to mosques." According to (A), (G), (J-1) "AlThumairy and AlBayoumi did not like each other," adding that "AlBayoumi was not a representative of the Saudi IFTA office...AlBayoumi represented a different part of the Saudi Government (A), (G), (J-1) did not say which part of the Saudi Government AlBayoumi represented)" (F).

Finally, the Saudi Arabian telephone number (P-1) is included merely because of its temporal proximity to the other telephone numbers called by AL-THUMARY. At this time

[REDACTED]

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Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

the significance of the telephone number or of such contact is unknown.

[REDACTED] The significance of this [REDACTED] (A), (G), (J-1), (D) [REDACTED] remains unclear. However, a few things seem apparent: 1) AL-THUMARY was part of a Saudi-based network operating out of the Embassy and Consulate(s); 2) this network is reported to have had the purpose of distributing funds and support to sunni salafist extremists; 3) there were inexplicable telephonic connections between AL-THUMARY and a number of San Diego-based individuals prior to the arrival of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI; and 4) these same San Diego-based individuals provided some of the most obvious and tangible assistance to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI.

[REDACTED] **Recruitment:** AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI do not appear to have arrived in southern California with an active local support network. However, it appears that once AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were vouched for, via tazkia, they may have begun to assess individual's suitability for recruitment.

[REDACTED] Multiple individuals stated that they felt "like they were being recruited," or "assessed" for their potential willingness to assist AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F). Additionally AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were reported to have been associating with a group of similarly-aged and similarly-situated (i.e., students, single) individuals in Southern California. Of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI came to the United States earliest and stayed the longest. During such time, AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been recruiting individuals for potential future operations.

[REDACTED] **Newly Identified Additional Individuals:** Through the intelligence collection effort under the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] (F) as well as additional analysis of telephone and financial activity and source reporting, some additional individuals, who's involvement with the above described group is still not fully understood, have been identified:

[REDACTED] **MOHAMMED BIN SULEIMAN AL-MUHANNA** [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED] (F) - POB: Likely [REDACTED] (P-1) DOB: [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974 or [REDACTED] (P-1) 1974; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. AL-MUHANNA was previously a Consular Official at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, and is reported to have founded, with AL-THUMARY, the KFM. [REDACTED] (O-1) [REDACTED] "AL-MUHANNA is a Sunni Islamic extremist associated with a radical form of the Salafi ideology...and a graduate of the Ibn Mohammad Islamic University in Riyadh" [REDACTED] (F). AL-MUHANNA had numerous [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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phone connections with AL-THUMARY, as would be expected, and with AL-JARRAH. In late March, 2003, FBI Los Angeles was directed to

(A)(G)(J-1)

plan

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

he and his family left the United States for

gland.

(C-1)

(C-1)

(F)

FAISAL AL-MUHANNA

(F)

- POB: Likely (P-1) DOB: (P-1) 1976; Currently located in Saudi Arabia. FAISAL AL-MUHANNA is the brother of MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA.

(A)(G)(J-1)(D)

Predication for the Investigation

[REDACTED] As stated above, the prior intelligence gathering project [REDACTED] (F) established a possible modus operandi of AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI's for integrating into and receiving assistance from the local Muslim communities, i.e. tazkia.

This methodology could possibly be exploited in the future to help integrate and guarantee assistance to future AQ terrorists. The recent review of phone records and financial records coupled with source reporting on the above-described individuals may indicate the existence of a group of like-minded individuals who provided assistance, financial and otherwise, to AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI, during their time in the U.S. AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI may have been able to "plug into" what appears to be a extremist Saudi-based financial support group through the use of tazkia. This information provides specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist, as the group or organization that these above-described individuals compose i) is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and/or ii) is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a threat to the national security (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power.

Possible Nexus to a Foreign Power

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At this point in the investigation, there are a number of different scenarios in which the foreign power involved could be AQ, Saudi Arabia, specifically the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, or both. The group that AL-MIHDHAR and AL-HAZMI were able to exploit and/or utilize could be 1) a group of AQ operatives who had infiltrated the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and who were unbeknownst to the Saudi government utilizing the resources of the Ministry for their own objectives, 2) a radical element within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs unaffiliated with AQ or 3) a collaboration of AQ operatives and certain radical elements within the Ministry of Islamic Affairs for mutually beneficial goals.

Pertinent Sensitive National Security Matters

A sensitive national security matter exists as a number of individuals identified herein were or may currently hold diplomatic status in the Saudi Arabian government, including FAHAD AL-THUMARY, MOHAMMED AL-MUHANNA and MUSAED A. AL-JARRAH.

Known Identifiers

Descriptive Data:

Main Subject

Name -

Last:

AL-THUMARY

First:

FAHAD

Middle:

I. A.

Race:

W

Sex:

M

DOB:

(P-1) 1971

POB:

(P-1)

PNO:

SOC:

Alias(es) -

Last:

AL-THUMAIRY

First:

FN

Middle:

(P)

Phone #:

Current Location:

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

(A)(G)(J-1)

(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -

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 Re: (F) 10/23/2007

Last: AL-BAYOUMI
 First: OMAR
 Middle: AHMED MUSTAFA
 Race: W
 Sex: M
 DOB: (P-1) 1957
 POB: (P-1)
 PNO:
 SOC:
 Phone #: (P)
 Miscellaneous -
 (A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER.

(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -
 Last: AL-MUHANNA
 First: MOHAMMED
 Middle: BIN SULEIMAN
 Race: W
 Sex:
 DOB: (P-1) 1974, (P-1) 1974
 Alias(es) -
 Last: AL-MOHANNA
 Middle: S.
 Phone #: (P)
 Miscellaneous -
 (A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER and
 brother of FAISAL AL-MUHANNA
 (A)(G)(J-1)

(A), (G), (J-1)

Name -
 Last: AL-MUHANNA
 First: FAISAL
 Middle: A.
 Race: W
 Sex: M
 DOB: (P-1)
 POB: (P-1)
 PNO:
 Alias(es) -
 Last: AL-MOHANNA, ALMUHALKA
 Phone #: (P)

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Miscellaneous -

(A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER and
UHANNA

(A)(G)(J-1)

Main Subject

Name -

Last:

AULAQI

First:

ANWAR

Middle:

NASSER

Current Case #

(F)

Main Subject

Name -

Last:

(P)

First:

Middle:

Race:

B/W

Sex:

M

DOB:

(P-1) 1975

POB:

Mogadishu, Somalia

ARN:

(P-1)

PNO:

SOC:

Address(es) -

House #:

(P-1)

Street Name:

City:

State:

Postal Code:

(P-1)

Country:

Canada

Phone #:

(P)

Miscellaneous -

Subject is an USPER.

Main Subject

Name -

Last:

AL-JARRAH

First:

MUSAED

Middle:

A.

Race:

W

Sex:

M

DOB:

(P-1) 1960

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

POB:

[REDACTED] (P-1)

Phone #:

[REDACTED] (P)

Miscellaneous -
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

Subject is a non-USPER.
[REDACTED] (A)(G)(J-1)

[REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: [REDACTED] (F) 10/23/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to provide notice of the initiation of this investigation to the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and DOJ's Criminal Division.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] Coordinate [REDACTED] (G) as required based on information in the Details section above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] is requested to process the (G) [REDACTED] which is being submitted via email to the (G) mailbox at [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] case to the [REDACTED] (G) [REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

♦♦

EO 14040-
000721-723

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/02/2004

To: San Diego

From: San Diego

(G)

Contact: SA (S)

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: (S)

Case ID #: (F)

Title: Omar Abdi Mohamed,
aka, Et Al;
(A), (G), (J-1)

Synopsis: (G) Reporting

(G)

Details: On July 1, 2004, San Diego FBI SA (S) met
with (A), (G), (J-1) (G)
(G) provided
the following information:

When Omar Abdi Mohamed, aka Omar Khaib, lived in Canada he was an outspoken proponent of jihad against non-Muslim movements taking place in Somalia. Specifically, Mohamed supported armed actions against Ethiopia and Christian organizations that operated humanitarian missions in Somalia. Mohamed believed in jihad as the only way to unite Somali's to form a unified Islamic government.

Mohamed bragged to the Somali community in San Diego about working for the Saudi Ministry of Dawa and Islamic Affairs. Working for the Ministry of Islamic Affairs was prestigious because you were being paid directly by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

EO14040-000721

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/02/2004

Other workers received their payments from the Saudi Government indirectly through Saudi supported charities. To work for the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, one had to be trained in a Saudi supported madrassa and, more importantly, you had to be recommended by an influential Islamic Scholar. The Ministry allowed you to choose the community where you wanted to work.

[REDACTED] In the United States, Ministry workers reported directly to the Saudi Embassy in Washington D.C. Mohamed's point of contact at the Saudi Ministry of Islamic affairs was Khaled al-Sowailem. Al-Sowailem visited San Diego one time with a group of about 9 other people. Al-Sowailem met with Mohamed, [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P), and an unidentified business associate of [REDACTED] (P)

[REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] was another person paid by Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs. (San Diego believes [REDACTED] (P) to be [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) is a Somali born [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) father is a prominent Islamic scholar [REDACTED] (P) studied Islam in a madrassa in Saudi Arabia. After studying in Saudi Arabia he returned to Africa and requested political asylum in the United States. [REDACTED] (P) had a lawyer named [REDACTED] (P) who helped him fill out his asylum claim. [REDACTED] (P) convinced [REDACTED] (P) to fill out the asylum request claiming that [REDACTED] (P). It is common knowledge in the Somali community that [REDACTED] (P) [REDACTED] (P) has since been deported from the US.

[REDACTED] (P) used to report to a Saudi Ministry officer named Fahd Althumairy. Althumairy worked out of the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, California, and oversaw the disbursement of Saudi money to Saudi religious workers in San Diego. At one point Althumairy became angry with [REDACTED] (P) because [REDACTED] (P) was holding a job at [REDACTED] (P) in addition to being paid by the Saudi government. Althumairy believed that [REDACTED] (P) was supposed to be dedicated to working for Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs since they were giving him money. Althumairy had since left the United States.

[REDACTED] Mohdar Abdullah had been deported to Yemen. [REDACTED] (A), (G), (A), (G), (J-1)

[REDACTED] Mohdar rented an apartment from [REDACTED] (P) when Mohdar was living in San Diego. Mohdar called [REDACTED] (P) several times at home and on his cellular telephone. Mohdar wanted [REDACTED] (P) to join him as a partner in an import/export business. [REDACTED] (P) was very angry that Mohdar kept trying to contact [REDACTED] (P) and forbid

[REDACTED]

To: San Diego From: San Diego
Re: [REDACTED] (F) [REDACTED], 07/02/2004

(P) [REDACTED] to communicate with Mohdar. Many people in the San Diego Muslim community feel that Mohdar is nothing but trouble and should be left alone.

(P) [REDACTED] is also running a charity called (P) [REDACTED]. (P) [REDACTED] wanted to close the charity down, but was urged by a San Diego (P) [REDACTED] to keep it operational. (P) [REDACTED] himself had been denied his application to open a tax exempt non-profit organization. Because (P) [REDACTED] was denied, he wanted to use (P) [REDACTED] and (P) [REDACTED] as his personal fund raising organization. (P) [REDACTED] was resistant to the idea of being (P) [REDACTED] puppet. But, (P) [REDACTED] convinced (P) [REDACTED] open for (P) [REDACTED] because (P) [REDACTED] worked for (P) [REDACTED] at his (P) [REDACTED] and thought (P) [REDACTED] was a good guy.

(P) [REDACTED] is very involved in fund raising and charitable causes, but he is not a radical. He is very naive and easily manipulated out of his desire to help poor and needy Muslims worldwide.

♦♦